H5N1 virus introduced from China by illegally traded poultry. We found that the main products 23 imported from China are spent hens, DOCs (Day Old Chicks) and ducklings; spent hens being 24 introduced in very large number. The drivers of this trade are multiple: economic (especially for spent 25 hens) but also technical (demand for improved genetic potential for DOC and ducklings). 26
Furthermore, these introductions also meet a high consumer demand at certain periods of the year. We 27 also found that spatial dispersion of a batch of poultry illegally introduced from China is extensive and 28 rapid, making any prediction of possible new outbreaks very hazardous. Finally, a risk mitigation plan 29 should include measures to tackle the drivers of this trade or to legally organize it, in order to limit the 30 threat to the local poultry sector. It is also essential for traders to be progressively better organised and 31 biosecure and for hygienic practices to be enforced, since our study confirmed that at-risk behaviours 32 are still very common among this profession. 33
INTRODUCTION 35
The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) virus was first detected in Vietnam in 36 2001 and the first epidemic in poultry was declared in late 2003 (FAO, 2011) . Since this first major 37 epidemic, several other waves of outbreaks have occurred in the country (Minh et al., 2009; Pfeiffer 38 D.U et al., 2007) . All the 6 HA clades of the HPAI H5N1 viruses identified in Vietnam since 2001 39 have precursor viruses isolated previously in mainland China and Hong Kong SAR (Wan et al., 2008) . Thus, the risk of introduction of H5N1 viruses via the illegal poultry trade from China is recognized 50 but information is still lacking in regard to the extent of this trade, its organization in space and time as 51 well as the poultry types involved. Without this information it is difficult to assess the role of this trade 52 in the epidemiology of the HPAI H5N1 disease in Vietnam and to propose adequate control and 53 preventive measures. Furthermore, the recent sanitary crises in China with the emergence of the new 54 virus H7N9 (WHO, 2013) have highlighted the need to better understand the drivers and pathways of 55 illegal poultry trading in order to identify specific measures to help decrease the risk of disease 56 spreading at regional level. 57
The present study aimed at i) identifying the type of poultry imported and the actors involved in this 58 trade, ii) identifying a possible seasonal pattern for these imports, iii) identifying the main drivers 59 underlying this trade. This information was then used to qualitatively evaluate the risk of exposure of susceptible poultry in Vietnam to HPAI H5N1 virus introduced from China by illegally traded Chinese 61 poultry.MATERIALS AND METHODS 62
Questionnaire and study site 63
Two questionnaires were developed, tested and administered by a Vietnamese researcher. One was 64 targeted at traders and the other at farmers. The questions were related to the total amount of poultry 65 bought by each informant, the monthly distribution of Chinese poultry yearly traded by each trader, 66 the trading connections of the informants (where or to whom traders and farmers were selling and 67 buying their poultry and in what proportion) as well as general information about trading practices 68 (number of journeys to China per year for a trader and the duration of transport), reason for buying 69
Chinese poultry and possible at-risk behaviour (disinfection or not of the cages, storage of the birds 70 before selling, farmers' behaviour in case of disease...). The area of interest was the border between 71
Vietnam and China in Lang Son province ( Figure 2 ). 72
Identification of key informants and selection of traders and farmers 73
In order to identify and select the traders to be interviewed, one or two key informants were first 74 contacted in the provinces located in the Red River Delta and North West administrative regions. Most 75 of those key-informants were in charge of animal movements in the local or provincial veterinary 76 services. Key informants were generally aware of the illegal trade in their area, but often had limited 77 power to control it. In some of the provinces contacted, the key informants were able to provide a list 78 of traders' contacts. We then contacted these traders to collect general information about their activity 79 in order to roughly identify different trader profiles. We then selected traders for face-to-face 80 interviews with the objective of getting a good representation of the different types of traders involved 81 in the illegal poultry trade with China in that region. Our objective was to personally interview 10 82 traders. From the results of the traders' interviews, farmers raising poultry from China were then 83 identified and 10 were selected for interview. Following the selection procedure described above, a list of around 50 traders known to be involved in 86 poultry trading from China was built. Some traders were clearly identified and could be contacted by 87 phone for the first general, informal interview. Information about traders importing poultry from China 88 was obtained from Bac Giang, Bac Ninh, Hai Phong and Ha Tay provinces. No information could be 89 gathered from Lang Son province. Then a selection was made, including both direct importers and 90 provincial traders, according to the initial information collected by phone. Three initially selected 91 traders refused to be interviewed and had to be replaced. Face-to-face interviews were then organized 92 in the province of origin of the 10 selected traders (6 in Bac Giang, 2 in Bac Ninh, 1 in Ha Tay and 1 93 in Hai Phong province). Following interviews with traders, 10 farmers were identified and interviewed 94 in 4 different provinces (3 in Bac Giang, 1 in Ha Tay, 5 in Hung Yen and 1 in Thai Nguyen). 95
Risk assessment framework 96
The risk assessment is the component of risk analysis that estimates the likelihood of occurrence and 97 the magnitude of consequences of any given hazard. Hazard identification consists in identifying the 98 pathogenic agents which could potentially produce adverse consequences associated, in our context, 99 with the importation of a commodity. Risk assessment needs to be flexible to deal with the complexity 100 of real life situations. No single method is applicable in all cases (OIE, 2013). We applied the 101 commonly accepted framework for risk assessment related to the introduction of disease derived from 102 the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (OIE, 2013). Our objective was limited to evaluating the 103 likelihood of exposure of poultry susceptible to HPAI H5N1 viruses released by illegally traded 104 Chinese poultry. Thus, having identified the hazard, we studied the risk of release before conducting 105 the exposure assessment. 106
Due to the difficulty of collecting data about illegal trade, only a preliminary qualitative assessment 107 was targeted. A qualitative risk assessment ends with a qualitative estimation of the risk being studied 108 usually into four categories: negligible, low, medium and high (Zepeda, 1998). We first built an event 109 tree (Voose, 2000) of the main steps leading to the release and exposure of the hazard in our context, 110 separately for the import of poultry intended for consumption and poultry intended for breeding. The likelihood of each of these events was then estimated before they were combined to obtain the final 112 estimation of the likelihood of exposure using a combination matrix for independent events (Wieland 113 et al., 2011) (Table 1) . In order to estimate the likelihood of each event, different parameters were 114 considered as proposed by the OIE guideline (OIE, 2013). For the release assessment, the main 115 parameters to consider were 1) an estimation of the prevalence of the HPAI H5N1 in China as well as 116 an evaluation of the quality of the monitoring system by which this data was obtained; 2) the volume 117 of poultry trade from China to Northern Vietnam; 3) the efficiency of border control. For the exposure 118 assessment, the main parameters to consider were 1) the absence or not of clinical signs in the case of 119 infection in the birds being illegally imported; 2) the identification of animals, people or fomites 120 possibly exposed to the hazard; 3) the measures that may limit the exposure of susceptible animals; 4) 121 the destination and use of the source of hazard or contaminated products. 122
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 123

Identification of the actors involved in this illegal trade 124
Based on the interviews results, three main types of traders involved in the illegal trade of Chinese 125 poultry were identified: 126 -Importing traders: traders importing poultry directly from China (4 were interviewed); 127 -Large-scale provincial traders: traders buying poultry from the importing traders and selling 128 mainly to other traders in different provinces (1 interviewed); 129 -Small traders: traders buying mainly from big provincial traders (5 interviewed). 130
Only two of the traders were exclusively trading poultry from China, the others were also trading 131 Vietnamese poultry. 132
From the initial informal interviews with key informants and with traders, we learnt that:
-The importing traders are persons with strong local political support. 136 -Once the importing trader has made an agreement with an exporting trader in China, they rely 137 on transporters on foot or on motorbike to cross the borders (Tran Viet, 2007) . At this stage, 138 the transporters can be stopped by the police and the commodities can be seized, but most of 139 the birds finally enter Vietnam. All birds are then gathered somewhere in Vietnam before 140 being sent by truck or motorbike to their final destination (mainly to other traders who will 141 then distribute them to farmers, markets or restaurants). 142
-Birds can still be confiscated on the way to their final destination, but very often, drivers hired 143 by the importing traders succeed in avoiding problems by paying bribes to the officials at the 144 checkpoints or at the market places. preferred by consumers to industrial chicken broilers and the consumers can hardly tell the difference 171 between spent hens and local chickens, once dressed. Furthermore, the meat is as tough as local 172 chicken meat (Nguyen, 2010) and restaurants can increase their profits by buying Chinese spent hens 173 at a lower price. The origin of the poultry is not promoted by the traders or the sellers: all traders who 174 answered the question related to information about the origin of the birds declared that the consumers 175
were not informed that poultry originally came from China. Thus, despite expenses along the 176 commodity chain (transport, bribes, storage) also described by de Haan et al (2011), the benefits must 177 remain significant for the traders. The import of spent hens for meat consumption is also motivated by 178 the high demand at certain periods of the year (see following section on seasonality). 179
The import of DOCs and ducklings from China seems to be more related to a specific demand of 180 Vietnamese poultry farmers for improved genetic potential rather than a financial interest. Indeed, 181
Chinese animals are reputed to have better performance characteristics than Vietnamese DOCs and 182 ducklings, probably because the private Vietnamese hatcheries do not provide good sanitary and 183 genetic guarantees. It was also reported by Phan et al (2010) that Vietnamese supply was insufficient 184 for local demand. Thus, some of the farmers interviewed reported that laying hens from China produce interviewed declared that DOCs and ducklings from China were more expensive than animals from 187
Vietnam, 1 said they were of a similar price and 1 they were less expensive. 188
Seasonality of Chinese poultry trading 189
The import of Chinese poultry occurs all year long but there is some variation in the quantity imported Vietnamese consumers at a period during which chicken is a popular meal. 198
The peak in the import of spent hens is also connected to the Têt celebration. Nevertheless, this 199 percentage has been calculated for only 2 traders, and the peak was only consequential for one of 200 them. The other one, importing more than 20 million birds per year, presented a constant distribution 201 of his import throughout the year with a slack period only during the hot season from May to August. 202
Seasonal tendency still needs to be validated even if the intensification of illegal import of chickens 203 before the Vietnamese New Year has also been described by other sources (Tran Viet, 2007) . 204
The import of ducklings is higher around March and then until July (Figure 1 ). February to May-June 205 is the period of the first annual rice crop in Northern Vietnam and from June to September-October, 206 the period of the second rice crop. It is well known that duck production is connected to rice 207 production with the ducks being sent out to the rice fields just after rice transplantation for pest control 208 or just after the harvest to scavenge weeds, crop residues, snails and fresh water crustaceans (Desvaux 209 and Dinh, 2008). Thus, the import of duckling is connected to the rice production calendar. In 210 Northern Vietnam, there are no more than 2 rice crops per year and the first rice crop involves a larger 211 geographical area as not all plots of land are suitable for a second rice crop in the year.
Spatial spreading and risk management by traders and farmers 213
From the interviews it appears that traders were illegally importing poultry from China not only at the 214 border with Lang Son province, but also in the province of Quang Ninh (Figure 2 ). Those two 215 provinces share their borders with Guangxi province in China. From the questions related to the places 216 where the importing traders were selling Chinese poultry, a map could be drawn showing the spatial 217 dispersion of the birds (Figure 2 ). It shows that from only two main ports of entry, Chinese poultry are 218 sent on to most of the provinces in Northern Vietnam. Therefore, poultry imported without any 219 sanitary control or guarantee can travel quite long distances. 220
The birds are either transported by motorbike (around 100 adults or 2000 DOCs or ducklings per 221 motorbike and up to 500 to 700 adults if a trailer is used) or by truck (from 4000 to 6000 adults). 222
According to the survey, the average transportation time is 4 to 5 hours (min: 1 to 2 hours, max: 7 to 8 223 hours) by the traders. 224
Only 3 traders out of 10 declared that they disinfected the material used to transport the poultry (cages 225 and vehicle), the others only used water for cleaning. 226
Seven out of 10 traders declared that in normal circumstances, they needed to store the birds for 227 several hours or days before selling them (mean: 7 hours, min: 1 hour, max: 2 days). The birds are 228 stored either at their house or farm or at the selling place (market) where they can be in contact with 229 other poultry (in 6 cases out of 7). Six traders also declared they sometimes take unsold animals back 230 to their house for 1 to 3 days prior to selling them at a cheaper price to the local markets or to farmers 231 in their village. This practice supports a previous finding indicating that villages with poultry traders 232 were more at risk of a H5N1 outbreak than others (Desvaux, 2011a) . 233
Farmers' behaviour in the event of mortality at their farm varies according to the situation and the type 234 of poultry involved. They either organize proper disposal of the dead birds (by burying or burning), or 235 use the carcasses, especially the young ones, to feed other animals (dogs, pigs, or fish, after cooking) 236 or attempt to quickly sell off the remaining healthy birds if they are older. When disease is reported in limitation of visits into the house and farm or preventive treatment of the birds with antibiotics and 239 "tonics". These observations were consistent with findings from another field study conducted in 240 another area of Northern Vietnam (Desvaux and Figuié, 2011b) . 241
Qualitative risk assessment 242
The objective was to estimate the likelihood of exposure of poultry susceptible to HPAI H5N1 viruses 243 released by illegally traded Chinese poultry. 244
The hazard under consideration in this study is HPAI H5N1 virus circulating in China. 245
Risk pathways 246
The steps leading to the release and direct or indirect exposure (via fomites) of Vietnamese poultry to 247 HPAI H5N1 viruses excreted by poultry illegally introduced from China are detailed in a risk pathway 248 ( Figure 3) . 249
Release assessment 250
To estimate the probability that at least one batch of spent hens, DOCs or ducklings was infected, we 251 considered that i) China only declared around 100 outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 disease between 2003 and 252 2009 but, according to the FAO (FAO, 2011), not all cases are detected or reported and the disease is 253 considered to be endemic in the country despite the mass vaccination programme implemented 254 ; ii) the illegal import of live poultry from China is a significant trade, with the 255 quantity of poultry imported without any sanitary control estimated at several thousand per day: iii) 256 veterinary controls at the borders have limited impact on this trade; iv) spent hens are known to travel 257 long distances within China before being exported to Vietnam and may have been exposed to HPAI 258 H5N1viruses during transport; v) DOCs and ducklings are produced by breeders most probably 259 vaccinated against the HPAI H5N1 (FAO, 2011). 260
The likelihood of a release of H5N1 viruses in Vietnam through the illegal trade of poultry can be 261 estimated as high for spent hens and moderate for DOCs and ducklings.
Exposure assessment 263
To estimate the probability of exposure, we consider that: 264 i) importing traders check the sanitary conditions of the birds before paying the exporting trader 265 but that some birds may be infected without clinical signs: 266 a. the protection induced by the vaccination with an inactivated vaccine does not last for 267 more than 3 to 4 months under field conditions (Desvaux, 2013 the birds can be stored from 1 to several days at a trader's house, -during storage at a trader's house, during transport or at the market places, the 286 spent hens can be in contact with live poultry intended for breeding, from China or from 287
Vietnam. 288 v) Fomites or water contaminated by infectious faeces can be a source of indirect transmission of 289 the virus for a quite extended period of time, depending on the environmental conditions 290 (Brown et al., 2007; Stallknecht and Brown, 2009) . 291
Based on the risk pathways (Figure 3 ) and the above elements, we found that the risk of direct or 292 indirect exposure of susceptible poultry was qualitatively higher in the case of illegally introduced 293 infected spent hens or ducklings compared to a batch of DOCs (Table III) . 294
295
CONCLUSIONS 296
The illegal trade of poultry from China unquestionably contributes to the epidemiology of the H5N1 297
HPAI disease in Vietnam by regular introductions of new avian influenza strains into the domestic 298
Vietnamese poultry population. The study conducted here enabled a better understanding of this trade 299 and provided some clues to limit the risk of virus introduction. 300
The qualitative exposure assessment conducted showed that the risk of direct exposure due to an 301 infected batch of spent hens or ducklings illegally introduced from China was greater compared to the 302 introduction of an infected batch of DOCs. Considering the volume of poultry illegally introduced 303 yearly from China (estimated to be of thousands of tons per year) and the spatial dispersion of the 304 poultry illegally introduced, any prediction of the occurrence of new outbreak becomes a real 305 challenge. 306
The study of drivers underlying this trade showed that apart from financial motivation for the 307 importing traders, there is also i) a farmers' demand motivated by technical aspects and ii) consumer 308 demand, especially at certain periods of the year such as the Têt celebration (lunar new year), that may 309 not be satisfied by the national supply. Thus, efforts to stop this trade without tackling these issues will be in vain. Solutions have to be found to satisfy DOC and duckling demand with legitimate supplies of 311 spent hens from China for consumption, if the birds are controlled and slaughtered directly. Secondly, 312 traders being an obvious source of virus dissemination, efforts should be made to better control and 313 supervise their working conditions. The poultry traders' profession needs to be better structured. 314
Getting the poultry traders licensed could be an option as long as the licensing process guarantees that 315 sanitary requirements are satisfied. Thus, a comprehensive solution should be sought by the 316 Vietnamese government in collaboration with the private sector and with the support of international 317 donors contributing to the global effort to control and prevent animal epidemics. Solutions such as 318 installing cleaning and disinfection points in all the main live poultry markets, with standard approved 319 cages to be used by all traders, might be a reasonable goal to achieve in the medium term. The results 320 of this study are even more important when considering the threat caused by the new virus H7N9. This 321 virus, which is highly pathogenic for humans, has the characteristic of circulating silently in birds 322 (Kahn et Richt, 2013) . This makes the improved biosecurity of live bird markets and trader awareness 323 of good hygiene practices essential to limit the spread of the virus and new human contaminations. 
